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FOREWORD
THE PRACTICE OF DISSENTING IN THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
Frank X. Altimari-
INTRODUCTION
When I chose to prepare this Foreword for the Brooklyn
Law Review's Second Circuit Review on the topic of dissenting
opinions, I was under the impression that I had filed few such
dissents. However, a search of the data banks on Westlaw and
Lexis provided factual information which I found surprising.
History will record that in slightly less than eight years of
service on the Court of Appeals, I have written to date1 174
majority opinions, 2 concurring opinions, and 18 dissents.
While I have long believed that writing a principled dis-
sent-when an appellate judge considers that such a dissent is
warranted-is one of a judge's most important obligations and
legacies, I was astonished to discover that I have dissented
quite so often. I really should pay more attention to the wis-
dom of my sainted mother, who taught me at an early age to
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The search examined opinions authored through May 20, 1993.
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"practice what you preach." Having steadfastly sought to im-
press upon my colleagues on the Second Circuit the importance
of consensus, I find that, to my surprise, approximately ten
percent of my opinions have taken the form of dissents.2 In-
deed, compared to the number of majority opinions I have
authored, the number of dissents is somewhat greater than the
average percentage of dissents filed in the Second Circuit over
the last three years.3 Therefore, I find myself obliged to use
this opportunity not only to explain but also to defend the
practice of dissenting in the Second Circuit. I do this in part
for my own edification, because we can never truly understand
our behavior until we are forced to explain it.
Not all of my predecessors have chosen to defend this
practice. Indeed one of the most distinguished jurists in the
history of this court, Judge Learned Hand, complained that a
dissenting opinion "cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity
on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely de-
2 This compares as follows to the other active members of the Circuit:
Judge Majority Opinions Dissents As a %
Meskill 472 51 10.8
Newman 462 38 8.2
Kearse 443 45 10.0
Cardamone 359 25 7.0
Winter 378 30 7.9
Pratt 258 25 9.6
Miner 213 21 9.8
Altimari 174 18 10.3
Mahoney 151 23 15.2
Walker 91 6 6.5
McLaughlin 64 3 4.6
' Records show that over the past three years, the average percentage of dis-
sents filed in the Second Circuit ranged between seven and eight percent. For the
period of November 1989 to November 1990, 548 opinions were filed with 43 dis-
sents. For the following year, November 1990 to November 1991, 615 opinions
were filed with 42 dissents. Finally, for the period of November 1991 to November
1992, a total of 532 opinions were filed with 44 dissents. Telephone Conversation
with Elaine B. Goldsmith, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (Jan. 21, 1993).
I must also note, however, that since my appointment to the Second Circuit
in December of 1985, my records indicate that I have sat on panels which issued
609 written opinions, including my own majority opinions, and I have chosen to
dissent in only 17 of those cases. Therefore, while my overall percentage of dis-
sents may be lower than the average, when I choose to write it is somewhat more
often in dissent than the overall average.
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pends."4 No doubt there are judges on this circuit today, like
judges on any appellate court assigned to write a majority
opinion, who view the prospect of a dissenting opinion as ...a
perpetually recurring mortification,... a fly in [the] oint-
ment... [or] the ounce of sour in a pound of sweet.'"'5 I, for
one, do not hold such views. While I am unwilling to go so far
as Justice William 0. Douglas, who once remarked that "[tihe
right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable for a
judge of an appellate court,"' I hope to outline in this Fore-
word the numerous benefits of a reasoned dissent.
A reasoned dissent is proof positive that the law is not an
accumulation of worn concepts and beliefs. It is a living, vi-
brant, ambulatory repository of reason and logic, and it lives
for all future generations to read and dwell upon. Hopefully, a
dissent is that rare combination of mind and heart which, for a
singular moment, are in total harmony with each other. Above
all, a dissent should make common sense, for what common
sense tells us, the law ought to ordain. That singular moment
to which I referred is best understood by the scholarly Greek
expression "Chronos," the moment when all things in life come
together.
In this delicately balanced debate, which all judges strug-
gle to resolve, it should always be remembered that a doctri-
naire fixity of views is a judge's anathema. Judges cannot and
should not be staunch apostles or advocates of any creed no
matter how lucid the vision-and yes, we all have a vision we
know to be absolute truth.
I. COMPARING THE PRACTICE OF DISSENTING
Initially I must contrast the practice of dissenting in the
Second Circuit with that of the United States Supreme Court.
On average, dissents are filed in less than ten percent of all
cases decided by written opinion in this circuit, whereas dis-
sents are filed in approximately sixty-one percent of all Su-
preme Court decisions! There are obvious reasons for this
4 LEARNED HAND, TiHE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 923 (1962)
(citation omitted in original).
'WILLIAM O. DOuGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4 (1960).
Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 380 (1992).
1993]
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disparity. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit by
design has little or no control over its docket, because an ap-
peal can be taken as of right. Consequently, the Second Circuit
must dispose of cases which do not raise issues of constitution-
al proportions as well as cases which raise no genuine issues
on appeal. I sometimes say to myself during the argument of a
particular appeal, "Why is this case before us?" In contrast, the
Supreme Court can refuse to grant certiorari. Furthermore, in
many of the cases argued before the Second Circuit, the out-
come is dictated by precedent.' While the Supreme Court is
only bound by prior case law to the extent that it values the
principle of stare decisis, a panel of the Second Circuit is bound
both by decisions of the Supreme Court and by the decisions of
prior panels.9 Where a particular outcome is mandated by
precedent, it is often pointless to dissent." Additionally, in
disposing of many of the commercial and securities cases that
arise in the Second Circuit, it is more important that the "rule
of law be settled, than it be settled right,"" because once the
law is settled parties can organize their activities according-
ly. 2 In such cases the judge holding the minority view often
defers to the judgment of the other two panel members. Final-
ly, the Supreme Court simply has more members than any
given panel of the Second Circuit, and it is much more likely
that at least one Supreme Court Justice will have a different
' Where no new law is being made, the Second Circuit will often dispose of
the case by summary order-an unpublished opinion which can only be relied
upon by the litigants. The percentages cited in this Foreword are based on only
published opinions.
' See, e.g., Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Org., 980 F.2d 153, 157-58 (2d Cir.
1992). Even though the members of the panel that heard Dunlap-McCuller were
frustrated by the fact that precedent precluded us from reviewing the district
court's grant of a new trial, we were bound to apply this precedent to the facts at
hand. The opinion, however, does express the panel's frustration in the hope that
the rule in the Second Circuit may someday be modified. Id.
10 Of course, if a judge believes that the rule being applied is unjust, a dissent
may well be warranted. See infra Part II.
1 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12 But see Peoples Westchester Say. Bank v. FDIC, 961 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir.
1992) (Altimari, J., dissenting), in which an important policy consideration drove
me to dissent even though the parties could have reorganized their activities sub-
sequent to the opinion in order to avoid future litigation. Specifically, I was con-
cerned with the practical realities of the lawyer-client banking relationship, as well
as the effect that reorganizing this relationship might have on the legal represen-
tation of indigents. Id. at 332-33.
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view than that expressed in the majority opinion.
There is, however, one justification for a judge on the Sec-
ond Circuit to write a dissent that is not of concern to Supreme
Court justices. A dissent filed by a member of a Second Circuit
panel often serves as a precursor for review either by the Su-
preme Court or by the entire Second Circuit through its in
banc practice. 3 It is much more likely for a case to be re-
viewed in banc when a dissent has been filed; 4 often times
the dissent serves as the blueprint for a new majority opin-
ion. 5 Certiorari is also granted much more frequently in a
case where a dissent has been filed.'6 Naturally, however, cor-
relation does not prove causality. While a dissent helps to
illustrate the difficult issues with which a panel has grappled,
it is the importance and complexity of the issues that typically
leads to a dissent, an in banc review or the grant of a writ of
certiorari. Nevertheless, if the litigants wish to avail them-
selves of the remaining avenues of appeal, a dissent can illus-
trate for the other members of the circuit as well as for the
Supreme Court where the line of battle should be drawn.
II. JUSTIFYING THE PRACTICE OF DISSENT
All that said, many of the justifications for filing a dissent
hold true regardless of the appellate court on which one sits.
Most notably, there are times when the principles that an
individual holds dear forces a dissent. Such is the case for an
appellate judge who, like Martin Luther, must sometimes con-
clude that "[here I stand, I cannot do otherwise."' 7 While
13 See Jon 0. Newman, In Bane Practice In The Second Circuit 1984-1988, 55
BROOK L. REv. 355 (1989).
1" From January 1986 through January 1992 twelve panel opinions have been
reheard in banc, and in nine of these twelve cases dissents were filed. Conversa-
tion with Elaine B. Goldsmith, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit (Jan. 21, 1993).
15 See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 952 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated on reh'g,
974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1383 (1993).
16 From January 1, 1991, through January 1, 1992, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in twenty-three cases decided by the Second Circuit. Dissents had been
filed in nine of these cases, including dissents in two cases that had been reheard
in banc. Conversation with Elaine B. Goldsmith, Clerk, United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit (Jan. 21, 1993).
17 ROLAND H. BAINTON, HERE I STAND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 185 (1950)
(quoting Martin Luther).
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dissenting merely for the sake of dissenting is pointless, I be-
lieve that when a member of a panel disagrees over deeply felt
values, he or she has a duty to articulate his or her disagree-
ment."8 When writing such dissents, a jurist attempts to be a
"prophet with honor" 9 by trying to outline the "evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society"'2 ° so as to "sow seeds for future harvest."21 Writing
such a dissent is not "an egoistic act-it is [a] duty."22 It is not
self-indulgence, but rather very hard work from which we
cannot shirk.2' For example, this was the result I humbly en-
deavored to achieve in the dissent that I filed in Doherty v.
Thornburgh.24 Permit me to apologize for the infamous "I." A
dissent after all is a very subjective and personal endeavor,
which is best described in the first person.
The long procedural and factual history surrounding Jo-
seph Patrick Thomas Doherty's deportation from this country
has been the subject of lengthy law review articles.' Suffice it
to say that by the time Doherty's fourth appeal was heard, he
had been detained in this country without bail for eight
years.26 Although Doherty was never charged with any crime
in the United States, he remained incarcerated at the Metro-
politan Correctional Center in New York City pending the
conclusion of extradition and deportation proceedings which
sought to return him to the United Kingdom.27 Both the Brit-
ish and the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") were quite anxious for Doherty's return be-
'8 See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS
L.J. 427 (1986).
19 ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT DISSENT-
ERS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1974).
20 Brennan, supra note 18, at 431 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 438.
23 Id.
24 943 F.2d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed,
112 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
' See, e.g., James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe
Doherty, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 317 (1992); Jennifer M. Corey, Note, Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Doherty: The Politics of Extradition, Deportation, and
Asylum, 16 MD. J. INT' L. & TRADE 83 (1992).
2" Doherty, 943 F.2d at 205.
27 Id. at 212 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
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cause, after escaping from Great Britain, Doherty had been
convicted in absentia for the murder of a British army captain
during a confrontation in Northern Ireland between the Provi-
sional Irish Republican Army, of which Doherty was a mem-
ber, and British soldiers.28 In the United States, however,
Doherty had won a number of legal victories that had prevent-
ed his extradition and deportation. Nevertheless, the British
and the INS remained undeterred, and through the initiation
of additional proceedings Doherty remained incarcerated with-
out the possibility of being released on bond.
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (Cedarbaum, J.) denied Doherty's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, through which Doherty had sought to be
released on bail, finding that Doherty's substantive due process
rights had not been violated. In affirming, the Second Circuit's
majority opinion held that aliens have a substantive due pro-
cess right to be free of arbitrary confinement pending depor-
tation, but concluded that Doherty's rights had not been so
violated.29 The majority reasoned that "[g]overnmental con-
duct that may be considered 'shocking' when it serves to de-
prive the life, liberty or property of a citizen may not be uncon-
stitutional when directed at an alien.""
I could not accept the majority's conclusion, because I did
find shocking the result of allowing
the government to indefinitely pursue a litigation strategy, which
was essentially designed to circumvent an extradition decision at the
expense of an individual's right to liberty. At some time, the
government's legitimate appeals impinge on the individual's rights
to such an extent that the Due Process Clause requires us to say to
the State-enough is enough-Thou shalt not.""
I concluded my dissent in Doherty with the observation that
[iut is a bitter irony that in this era in which totalitarian regimes are
adopting the language of freedom and looking to the United States
as a model of liberty and justice, we today find it acceptable that a
man who has not been charged with a crime in this country may
remain incarcerated here indefinitely. I have always believed that a
"8 Id. at 205.
21 Id. at 209.
o Id.
3, Id. at 213 (citing Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9, 21 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
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major difference between our Constitution and those that speak of
justice in bold terms, but fail to provide it in reality, is that our
Constitution provides for a judicial branch that is charged with the
task of safeguarding individuals' rights, be they citizens or not.
Concededly, there is a difference between the rights of citizens as
compared to those of non-citizens. The facts of this case, however,
clearly transcend these differences. Ultimately, it is judges who
must give substantive content to the meaning of the Constitution.
Thus, I cannot in good conscience sit idly by and allow the Due
Process Clause to become mere words. Because I believe that the
Due Process Clause will not permit an indefinite confinement, or
even the confinement for eight years, of an individual who has not
been criminally charged and is merely awaiting deportation, I would
reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instruc-
tions to the court to set appropriate bail."
As one commentator has observed, perhaps those who agree
with my conclusion discerned an ally in "establishment," such
that the venting of my judicial frustration in dissent served to
dissipate the anger of those who felt disenfranchised by the
majority opinion."
In writing my dissent in Doherty I could only hope that
Justice Cardozo was correct when he observed that
[tihe voice of the majority may be that of force triumphant, content
with the plaudits of the hour, and recking little of the morrow. The
dissenter speaks to the future, and his voice is pitched to a key that
will carry through the years. Read some of the great dissents...
and feel after the cooling time of the better part of a century the
glow and fire of a faith that was content to bide its hour. The proph-
et and martyr do not see the hooting throng. Their eyes are fixed on
the eternities."'
Only time will tell.
Indeed, in time the persistent dissents of Judge Learned
Hand in admiralty cases applying the longstanding practice of
divided damages were rewarded. Despite his professed disap-
32 Id. at 214.
"3 Edward C. Voss, Dissent: Sign of a Healthy Court, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643,
655 (1992).
-' BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND AD-
DRESSES 36 (1931).
Indeed, Justice Charles Evans Hughes, of similar mind, once stated that "a
dissent in a Court of last resort is an appeal to the broadening spirit of the law,
to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the
error in which the dissenting judge believes the Court to have been betrayed."
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
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proval of the practice of dissenting,85 Judge Hand in dissent
twice called for overturning the longstanding admiralty prac-
tice of dividing the damages equally whenever two parties
were at fault regardless of their comparative fault. 6 Some
twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co.37 unanimously accepted Judge Hand's
argument, and replaced the rule of divided damages with the
rule advocated by Judge Hand that damages be allocated pro-
portionally to the comparative fault of the parties.38 In so do-
ing the Court quoted at length Judge Hand's virulent critique
of the divided damages rule in National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v.
United States,39 where Judge Hand had concluded that
[a]n equal division in this case would be plainly unjust; they ought
to be divided in some proportion as five to one. And so they could be
but for our obstinate cleaving to the ancient rule which has been
abrogated by nearly all civilized nations. Indeed, the doctrine that a
court should not look too jealously at the navigation of one vessel,
when the faults of the other are glaring, is in the nature of a sop to
Cerberus. It is no doubt better than nothing; but it is inadequate to
reach the heart of the matter, and constitutes a constant temptation
to courts to avoid a decision on the merits."
Some commentators have observed that an important
purpose served by a dissent is to keep the majority vigilant,
because the prospect of a dissenting opinion acts as "an anti-
dote for judicial lethargy."4 While I believe that my col-
leagues and I always seek to do our very best, it may be that
the possibility of a dissent compels the majority to be especial-
ly reflective and meticulous in drafting the opinion.42 Un-
doubtedly the author of a majority opinion tries to avoid a
barbed rebuke, such as the one lobbed by an English jurist
who reportedly declared that he was dissenting "'for the rea-
3 See HAND, supra note 4, at 72.
" See Ulster Oil Transp. Corp. v. The Matton No. 20, 210 F.2d 106, 110 (2d
Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J., dissenting); National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States,
183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865
(1950).
31 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
'8 Id. at 411.
" 183 F.2d at 410 (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
'o National Bulk Carriers, 183 F.2d at 410 (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
41 Fuld, supra note 5, at 927.
42 Voss, supra note 33, at 655.
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sons so ably expressed in the majority opinion.' '
Finally, dissents not only indicate to the legal community
that the panel was divided, but in many instances serve also to
clarify and define the majority's holding. Indeed, I agree with
the observation made by some detractors of the practice of
dissenting, who argue that if attorneys want to know what the
law is not, then they should read the dissent. By outlining
what the law is not, dissents clarify what the law is and, in so
doing, can provide a signpost to lawyers in subsequent cases
when confronted with factual circumstances that may be dis-
tinguishable using the dissent as a springboard.'
CONCLUSION
I would like to thank the Brooklyn Law Review for allow-
ing me to reflect on the practice of dissenting in the Second
Circuit. As this brief Foreword should suggest, I believe that
the writing of a principled dissent is one of the most important
obligations of an appellate judge. Dissents are not unwarrant-
ed annoyances, rather they contribute to the most important of
all marketplaces-the marketplace of ideas. Indeed, I must
conclude by noting that my colleagues on the Second Circuit
"'are such nice and accomplished men [and women], that it is
almost a pleasure to be dissented from by them."'45
Fuld, supra note 5, at 924 (citation omitted in original).
" Voss, supra note 33, at 655.
4 Fuld, supra note 5, at 929 (quoting Asquith, Some Aspects of the Work of the
Court of Appeal, 1950 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. OF L. 350, 353).
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